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RESTITUTION-AVAILABILITY AS AN ALTERNATIVE REMEDY
WHERE PLAINTIFF HAs FULLY PERFORMED A CONTRACT To PROVIDE Goons OR SERVICES-It is hornbook law that restitution is
sometimes available as an alternative remedy to a party who has
suffered a breach of contract after having conferred a benefit on
the defaulting party. It is equally clear, however, that in many
cases where a benefit has been conferred, the plaintiff may not
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elect to sue for the value of his performance but is left to his
action for damages on the contract. The cases which are concerned with one or the other of the above rules constitute a large
portion of the area of the law called Restitution, and no attempt
will be made here to review all of the situations in which restitution may be available as an alternative remedy for breach
of contract. On the contrary, the purpose of this comment will be
to consider the availability of the remedy in a single class of cases
and to discuss some of the factors which may have caused the
courts to grant or deny the remedy in those cases. The rather
small group of cases with which this comment will be concerned
are those in which the plaintiff has fully performed, prior to a
breach by the defendant, a contract to deliver goods or render
services. For convenience, and also because of differing results
in the courts, the cases in which the defendant's obligation was
to pay money will be discussed separately from those in which
his obligation was to do something else.

I. Availability of the Remedy
A. Where Defendant's Obligation Is To Pay Money. When
the plaintiff has fully performed a valid contract to deliver goods
or render services for an agreed sum of money, and the defendant
has breached the contract by failing to pay, the courts have uniformly denied to the plaintiff the alternative remedy of rescission
and restitution for the value of his performance.1 While as a
matter of pleading the injured party may frame his complaint
in indebitatus assumpsit and rely on the common counts, this
is considered nothing more than a convenient method of collecting the debt raised by plaintiff's performance of the contract.2
It is everywhere agreed that if the evidence discloses the existence
of a special contract, the terms of the contract will control the
amount of recovery. 3 It has often been observed that this rule
represents a limitation on the use of the restitutionary remedy
1 Oliver v. Campbell, 43 Cal. (2d) 298, 273 P. (2d) 15 (1954), and cases collected in
5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §1110 (1951); 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, 2d ed., §§1458, 1459 (1937);
WOODWARD, QUASI-CONTRACTS §262 (1913). See also 2 CONTRACTS R.EsrATEMENT §350 (1932).
2 United States Potash Co. v. McNutt, (10th Cir. 1934) 70 F. (2d) 126, and cases collected in 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, 2d ed., §1459, p. 4076, n. 4 (1937).
3 Dermott v. Jones, 2 Wall. (69 U.S.) 1 (1864); Oliver L. Taetz, Inc. v. Groff, 363 Mo.
825, 253 S.W. (2d) 824 (1953). See cases collected in 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §1110 (1951) and
5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, 2d ed., §1459 (1937).
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that is logically difficult to explain in light of the treatment given
to similar situations.4 The case most difficult to distinguish in this
regard is that of a party who has partially performed a contract
to supply goods or services for money and has been prevented by
the defendant's breach from completing performance.5 In such
a case a large majority of the courts quite readily allow the plaintiff to rescind the contract and recover the fair value of his performance. 6 The arguments which are advanced in support of
the granting of restitution in the case of the plaintiff who has
only partially performed appear equally applicable to the case
of full performance. In both situations the plaintiff is free from
fault and the defendant has breached the contract after accepting
benefits through the plaintiff's performance. But such arguments,
while often successful when the plaintiff has rendered only part
performance, fall on deaf ears once it appears that the plaintiff
has fully performed. When full performance is shown, the plaintiff may sue only for the loss of his bargain, and the defendant
is given the benefit of the contract terms to limit the amount
of the judgment against him.
In view of the relative newness of the restitutionary remedy,
it is perhaps misleading to speak in terms of a limitation on the
substantive rights of a plaintiff who has fully performed such a
contract. It would probably be more accurate to say that a party
who has rendered only part performance prior to a breach has
been given a valuable alternative remedy that has not been given
to one who has fully performed a similar contract. But it is nevertheless true that a party who has rendered full performance is
in a much less favorable position than one who is prevented

4 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §1110, p. 484 (1951); 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, 2d ed., §1459, p.
4078, n. 6 (1937); WOODWARD, QUASI-CONTRACTS §262, p. 415 (1913).
5 The case of a plaintiff who seeks to recover money paid to the defendant for
promised goods or services which are not forthcoming appears logically to call for the
same result as where the plaintiff has rendered goods or services in expectation of payment.
But ,the case of money paid seems to be sui generis in the law of Restitution, and it is
believed that little would be gained by considering such a case in this discussion.
6 Spitalny v. Tanner Constr. Co., 75 Ariz. 192, 254 P. (2d) 440 (1953); Boomer v.
Muir, (Cal. App. 1933) 24 P. (2d) 570; Johnston v. Star .Bucket Pump Co., 274 Mo. 414,
202 S.W. 1143 (1918); 2 CoNTRACTs RESTATEMENT §347 (1932). See cases collected in 5
WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, 2d ed., §1459, p. 4077, n. 6 (1937); 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §1109
(1951). This proposition is subject to the qualification that if the part of the contract
performed by the plaintiff was an apportioned part of the whole contract for which a
definite sum had been agreed upon, the plaintiff's recovery is limited to the agreed sum.
See 2 CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT §351 (1932), and cases collected in 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS
§1111 (1951).
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from completing performance of the contract by defendant's
breach, if the market price of the goods or services accepted by
the defendant was above the contract figure. The existence of this
anomaly in the law has been recognized and criticized by textwriters for over half a century,7 but their suggestions that the
restitutionary remedy be extended to cases in which the plaintiff
has fully performed a contract calling for the payment of money
have gone entirely unheeded by the courts.
B. Where Defendant's Obligation Is Other Than To Pay
Money. The Restatement of Contracts notwithstanding,8 it seems
clear that restitution is ordinarily not available to a plaintiff who
has delivered goods or rendered services in full performance of
a contract which calls for some performance other than the
payment of money by the defendant. 9 It is true, however, that
the courts have not been as uniform in their refusal to grant
the alternative remedy in this type situation as they have been in
cases where the defendant's obligation was to pay money. Moreover, it appears that at least some progress in this area is being
made in extending the use of the restitutionary remedy.
A number of cases have allowed a quantum meruit recovery
of the value of services rendered where the promised consideration
was either stock or a share in a business.10 The value of the services rendered was also recovered where the defendant railroad
7 WOODWARD, QUASI-CONTRACTS §262 (1913), citing KEENER, QUASI-CONTRACTS, pp.
301, 302 (1893); 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §lllO (1951). Williston observes that this anomaly
" ..• puts it within the power of the defendant, in many instances, to determine the
extent of the plaintiff's recovery for a breach by the former." 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS,
2d ed., §1459, p. 4078, n. 6 (1937). But see 7 CoRN. L. Q. 166-170 (1922), where the use of
restitution as an alternative remedy for breach of contract, except in the case of money
paid, is disapproved.
s "The remedy of restitution in money is not available to one who has fully performed
his part of a contract, if the only part of the agreed exchange for such performance that
has not been rendered by the defendant is a sum of money constituting a liquidated
debt; but full performance does not make restitution unavailable if any part of the consideration due from the defendant in return is something other than a liquidated debt."
2 CONTRACTS R.EsTATEMENT §350 (1932).
9 Kopp v. Traders Gate City Nat. Bank, 357 Mo. 659, 210 S.W. (2d) 49 (19!8); Ogden
v. Ruhm, (2d Cir. 1925) 7 F. (2d) 1007; Clemmer v. Merriken, 144 Md. 675, 125 A. 394
(1924); Cook v. Dade, 191 Mich. 561, 158 N.W. 175 (1916); Osterling v. Cape May Hotel
Co., 82 N.J.L. 650, 83 A. 887 (19ll); Hull v. Thoms, 82 Conn. 647, 74 A. 925 (1910);
Pierson v. Spaulding, 61 Mich. 90, 27 N.W. 865 (1886); Slayton v. McDonald, 73 Me. 50
(1881); Mitchell v. Gile, 12 N.H. 390 (1841). The case most often cited for the proposition
that restitution is available in this situation, Clark v. Fairchild, 22 Wend. (N.Y.) 576 (1840),
is doubtful law in New York. Compare Ladue v. Seymour, 24 Wend. (N.Y.) 60 (1840);
Underhill v. Pomeroy, 2 Hill (N.Y.) 603 (1842); Thomas v. Dickinson, 12 N.Y. 364 (1855).
10 Bailey v. Interstate Airmotive, Inc., 358 Mo. ll21, 219 S.W. (2d) 333 (1949); Coens
v. Marousis, 275 Pa. 478, II9 A. 549 (1923); Humbert v. Chopy, (D.C. Colo. 1914) 216 F. 549.
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refused to deliver a promised pass over its lines. 11 Another situa. tion in which restitution of the value of plaintiff's performance
has sometimes been allowed is where the defendant has breached
a promise to compensate plaintiff by his will.12 But in almost
all these situations there are also cases denying restitution to the
plaintiff, and in many of the fact situations which might properly
fall under this general heading there is no authority at all in
favor of granting restitution. In sum, it appears that when the
defendant's promised performance is other than the payment
of money, the plaintiff who has fully performed is in a somewhat
better position with regard to getting restitution than he would
be if all that was owing to him was money. But this is only a
relative advantage since, even when the return performance is
not money, the plaintiff who has fully performed faces an uphill
struggle in his ·attempt to get the value of his performance rather
than the value of what was promised him.

II. Reasons Underlying the Refusal To Grant Restitution
When Plaintiff Has Fully Performed
The starting point for any discussion of the reasons why
restitution is or is not available in a given case must always
be with the historical origins of the ·remedy. Developed in part
by the law judges and in part by the chancellors, the remedy of
restitution was thought of as a strictly auxiliary remedy to be
used in situations where the standard common law remedies
sounding in tort or contract were not completely satisfactory.13
11 Brown v. St. Paul, M. & M. Ry. Co.,
12 Boldwin v. Lay, (Mo. App. 1920) 226

36 Minn. 236, 31 N.W. 941 (1886).
S.W. 602; Stone v. Todd, 49 N.J.L. 274, 8 A.
300 (1887). See also 69 A.L.R. 14 (1930). In many of the cases where the defendant's
promise was to leave property by will, it is difficult to determine if the contract \\·as within
the Statute of Frauds, and therefore, whether restitution was employed as an alternative
remedy. Some courts have said that the rendition of services constitutes "part payment"
which takes the contract out of both the Statute of Frauds and §4 of the Uniform Sales
Act. But other courts do not agree. See 2 Prrr. L. REv. 29 (1935).
13 5 CORBIN, CoNTRAcrs §1103 (1951). For a review of the status of the English law
of quasi-contract prior to the development of the action of indebitatus assumpsit around
the beginning of the seventeenth century, see JACKSON, HISTORY OF QUASI•CoNTRAcr 1-36
(1936). It was more than a century after Slade's Case was decided in 1602 before general
assumpsit was first employed as an alternative remedy for breach of contract in Dutch
v. Warren, 1 Str. 406, 93 Eng. Rep. 598 (1721), where the plaintiff was allowed to recover
money advanced to the defendant to buy stock. Use of the remedy in contract cases did
not become widespread until the time of Lord Mansfield in the latter half of the eighteenth century, but for sometime thereafter it expanded in many directions. See FIFOOT,
LORD MANSFIELD 141-157, 245-249 (1936). A strong reaction to the use of restitution in
many situations, including contract cases, occurred in England about the time of the Com-
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The use of restitution as an alternative remedy in breach of
contract cases was mainly the work of the law judges, but they
administered it with many of the same verbal palliatives used
by the chancellors during the development of the equitable
remedies. 14 They refused to apply it in many cases where the
damage remedy was felt to :tJe more appropriate, and this fact
produced many of the distinctions which seem so illogical today.
Although there was no expressly stated requirement of "inadequacy of the damage remedy," as in equity, the relative effectiveness of the action for damages undoubtedly was a major factor
in the granting or withholding of restitution in any particular
case.15 This factor goes a long way toward explaining some of
the logical inconsistencies mentioned above. For instance, a
plaintiff who, prior to a breach, has only partially performed
a contract to render goods or services is in a comparatively difficult position to establish his damages in an action on the contract. This is not so for the plaintiff who has fully performed;
and having no need of an auxiliary remedy, the party who had
fully performed was not given one. But however well the quasiequitable nature of the remedy serves to explain the origin
of the anomalies that exist in its present-day application, the
steadfast refusal of the courts in this century to extend the use
of restitution to cases in which the plaintiff has fully performed
calls for an explanation having more contemporary significance.
In view of the almost unanimous recommendation of the textwriters in recent years that restitution be made available to
a plaintiff who has fully performed a contract to provide goods
or services,16 at least where the counter-performance was other
than the payment of money, something more is required in the
mon Law Procedure Act of 1852. This reaction had the effect of halting the development
of restitution as an alternative remedy for breach of contract in England. FIFOOT, HisrORY
AND SOURCES OF THE COMMON LAW 368-370 (1949); DAWSON, UNJUsr ENRICHMENT 15-26
(1951).
14 The most famous of these nostrums is Lord Mansfield's comment in Moses v.
Macferlan, 2 Burr. 1005 at 1012, 97 Eng. Rep. 676 (1760): "In one word, the gist of this
kind of action is, that the defendant, upon the circumstances of the case, is obliged by
the ties of natural justice and equity to refund the money."
15 Occasionally, the courts expressly base the grant or denial of restitution on the
adequacy of the damage remedy. See, e.g., Judge Kellogg in Rosenwasser v. Blyn Shoes,
246 N.Y. 340, 159 N.E. 84 (1929): "A situation is presented where an action of damages
for breach of contract ••• would afford complete indemnity for the injury done••••"
16 KEENER, QUASI-CONTRACTS 301, 302 (1893); WOODWARD, QUASI-CONTRACTS §262 (1913),
adopting the arguments of Professor Keener; 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §1110 (1951); 5 WILLisTON, CONTRACTS, 2d ed., §1471 (1937).
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way of explanation than Justice Holmes' famous maxim: "A
page of history is worth a volume of logic."
Professor Corbin has suggested that the preferred position
of one who has only partially performed such a contract is best
explained on procedural grounds.17 He points out that a party
who has fully performed in this situation has available to him
both the action of debt for the sum due and an action for damages
on the contract, while the plaintiff who has partially performed
has, absent the restitutionary remedy, only his action on the
contract. By giving to the latter a restitutionary action for the
value of his performance, he is put in an equal position with
regard to the forms of action available to him in the event of
a breach. But Professor Williston has observed that in neither case
is the remedy of restitution absolutely necessary, since in either
situation the injured party has an effective remedy in an action
for damages on the contract.18 While it may be conceaed that
a desire to equalize the positions of the parties with respect to
the forms of action they may use might have played some part
in the granting of restitution to one who had partially performed, in light of our modern pleading practices it surely does
not go far to explain the extreme reluctance of our courts to
extend the remedy to a plaintiff who has fully performed prior to
a breach.
It is here suggested that there are several very practical
reasons why the courts have ignored both logic and the textwriters by continuing the practice of granting restitution to one
who has partially performed while denying it where there has
been full performance. In those cases where the defendant's
obligation is to pay money, the most important of these is the
matter of convenience. It is readjly apparent that in the case
of full performance of a contract calling for payment of a fixed
sum of money by the defendant, any court would be reluctant
to reject this ready-made measure of damages and get into the
sticky question of the fair value of the plaintiff's performance.
Such valuations are usually arrived at only after varying amounts
of conflicting evidence have been heard, and, even in the rare
case where there is no sharp conflict in the evidence, the value
arrived at lacks the aura of certainty and justness possessed by a

17 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §1110
18 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, 2d

(1951).
ed., §1459, pp. 4077, 4078 (1937).

1958]

COMMENTS

275

sum which was agreed upon by the parties when they entered
into their bargain. In those cases where full performance has
been rendered for an agreed price, therefore, this factor of convenience appears to be an insurmountable barrier to the application of restitution as an alternative remedy. In those cases where
the defendant's promised performance is not money but other
goods or services, the convenience factor is not such an obstacle.
On the contrary, it has been in the situations where valuation of
the promised performance was more difficult than arriving at the
worth of the goods or services rendered by the plaintiff that
restitution has been most often employed.19 But the usual situation in these cases is that the valuation difficulties are approximately equal between the rendered and the promised performances, so the convenience factor cannot be said to be a major
influence in the grant or refusal of restitution when the defendant's promised performance is goods or services.
There are other factors, however, which tend to inhibit the
use of the restitutionary remedy in these cases. One of these
considerations is the rather widespread notion that in granting
restitution a court is "making a new contract" for the parties.
This objection is occasionally raised in all types of cases where
restitution is employed as an alternative remedy for breach of
contract,20 but it apparently has added force when a plaintiff
who has fully performed comes into court asking for a sum different from the value of what he was promised. As has been
pointed out, there is little merit in this objection.21 When a court
assesses damages for breach of contract it does not purport to
enforce the contract specifically. The usual view is that the court
is attempting to put the injured party in the same position he
would have been in had there been no breach; but there is

19 E.g., a pass over the lines of a railroad, Brown v. St. Paul, M. &: M. Ry. Co., 36
Minn. 236, 31 N.W. 941 (1886); stock or a share in- a business, Bailey v. Interstate Airmotive, 358 Mo. 1121, 219 S.W. (2d) 333 (1949); Coens v. Marousis, 275 Pa. 478, 119 A.
549 (1923); Humbert v. Chopy, (D.C. Colo. 1914) 216 F. 549.
20 "Beyond doubt the only injury sustained by the mere breach of a contract is the
loss of the bargain. • . . I think the plaintiff in a building contract ought not to be
permitted, under the guise of a quantum meruit, for the alleged breach of the building
contract by the owner, to recover beyond the price fixed in the contract; for the reason
that any greater recovery would be, in effect, damages awarded for punishment rather
than compensation for loss of a bargain, and therefore opposed to the reason and spirit
of the law governing damages for breach of civil engagements." Judge Bond dissenting
in Johnston v. Star Bucket Pump Co., 274 Mo. 414 at 479, 202 S.W. 1143 (1918).
215 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §1106 (1951).
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nothing inherently more just in this approach than in the theory
which underlies the remedy of restitution, which is to put the
injured party in the position he was in before the contract was
entered into. In no case has the defendant agreed to pay damages
of any kind, and as he has seen fit to breach the contract there is
little reason to give him the benefit of the contract terms and
thereby relieve him from paying full value for what he has
received. The idea that a plaintiff who has fully performed should
get no more than he bargained for is still, however, an obstacle
which must be overcome in any attempt to get restitution.
The final factor which, it is believed, has limited the expansion of the restitutionary remedy to cases involving full performance by the plaintiff has been the fact that lawyers rarely
attempt to get restitution when their clients have suffered a
breach of contract. Where the breached contract has turned out
to be a bad bargain for tl1e defendant, the damage remedy is
obviously the better recourse for the plaintiff. But the lack of
case authority involving attempts to get restitution where the
plaintiff's performance was of more value than what he was
promised by the breaching defendant should not discourage an
attempt to invoke the restitutionary remedy in the appropriate
circumstances. The use of this remedy has expanded widely in
recent years and is still in the process of growth.22 With the
aid of the leading text-writers23 and the Restatement of Contracts,24 there is no valid reason why it Cc!;nnot be extended
further, especially to cases in which the plaintiff has rendered full
performance in goods or services for a promise by the defendant
to do something other than pay money.

Jerome K. Walsh, Jr., S.Ed.

See, generally, DAWSON,
Note 16 supra.
24 Note 8 supra.
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